Volume 4, Issue 3

Contents

  • Strategy and Security

    Colin S. Gray

    Strategy is about security, and it is always made in a political process. The theory for strategy takes two forms, general (and eternal) and for the military instruments particular to time and place. Strategy always must be done tactically and operationally. A primary challenge is the need to achieve the strategic effect necessary for political success.

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  • Operational art has been frequently discussed, but rarely from the perspective of strategy with the aim of examining what operational art means for strategy. Classical notions of strategy differed on the practicalities of achieving battle, but later developments focused attention on what would become, and thereby enabled, the operational level. Based on this historical overview, the relationship between operational art and strategy is explored to ascertain their compatibility. Both operational art and classical strategy recognize the necessity of nuance in thought and practice in the conduct of war, but operational art arguably prolongs the contemporary misunderstanding and misuse of strategy.

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  • This article argues the arms race before 1914 was driven by the military strategies of deterrence and coercion; as such, it was as much a tool of policy as the actual use of force in wartime. The case of the Great War suggests arms races do not in themselves cause wars; rather it is the strategies driving them that matter.

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  • It is easy for the strategist to overlook the role that the enemy plays in strategy, yet to do so compromises how effective strategy can be. The enemy is not only a definitional necessity for strategy, but also must be considered with regards the ends, ways and means of strategy. The intelligent strategist must also consider the enemy, not only as an obstacle to be overcome, but something to learn from.

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Volume 4, Issue 3

Volume 4, Issue 3

Spring 2015