Volume 3, Issue 4

Contents

  • Sometimes the obvious needs to be said to ensure that the obvious is not overlooked in the pursuit of the arcane of the wonderful. In this article, Colin S. Gray strips strategic thinking and ideas to the very basics that all those associated with the study of strategy need to acknowledge, or at least understand in order to progress sensible debate and insightful writing. Posed as four seemingly simple questions, this may make for uncomfortable reading for some, while being a refreshing blast of clarity and truth for others.

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  • Classical strategy’s core concepts imply different modes of strategic reasoning. While ends, ways, and means is a good heuristic for how to formally represent a strategy, we need more sophisticated ideas to understand strategy-making and strategic problems.

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  • In the wake of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, many believe that nations face a choice on whether to focus on regular or irregular warfare (guerrilla, warfare). This is a false choice. An examination of modern tactics reveals little difference between the tactics chosen by the soldier and those chosen by the guerrilla. This tactical reality has far-reaching implications for strategy, for it is in strategy where the true differences lie.

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  • In this article, Dr. Randy Borum uses the ancient metaphor of the fox and the hedgehog to discuss different ways of thinking about the global security environment. He suggests that that in a complex, interconnected and rapidly changing world, more agile, adaptive, intellectually diverse fox-like approaches will be needed to anticipate and adapt to what lies ahead.

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  • Policymakers often use analogical reasoning when making foreign policy decisions. To utilize analogical reasoning to avoid repeating the mistakes of failed operations, there must be a comprehensive understanding of historical events. In this article, Troy E. Smith analyses the failed attempts to oust Saddam Hussein from power, which cost the United States over USD 100 million and a substantial amount of embarrassment. He identifies flawed planning, assessment and mismatching of strategy and operations with foreign policy as determining factors in the failure of operations against Saddam Hussein.

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Volume 3, Issue 4

Volume 3, Issue 4

Winter 2014