Interested in strategy? Our 'reading list' is a catalog of books, articles, and conference papers compiled by the staff at IJ. From the classics to contemporary writings - all of these readings will no doubt benefit your interest and knowledge in strategy and other related fields.
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War & Warfare
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“Review from Washington Post: Each side's narrative is self-contained and in total conflict with the other. In the Israeli version, Holocaust survivors redeemed their ancestral homeland against extraordinary odds by defeating bloodthirsty Palestinian terrorists and five Arab armies, while thousands of Arab civilians abandoned their homes under the directive of leaders who promised glory and spoils upon their return. The Arab counter-narrative depicts Palestinians as hapless victims of a vastly superior Jewish army, backed by the United States and Britain, waging a brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing according to a plan laid out before the first shot was fired.
Both accounts contain elements of truth. Neither one was constructed for the sake of veracity, however. Each was useful in mobilizing members of a particular tribe to sustain the conflict: Israelis in their beleaguered fortress-state; Palestinians in their refugee camps, some still fondling the keys to their lost homes. The narratives have nurtured their separate identities -- and their enduring grievances.”
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“The writings of Carl von Clausewitz loom so large in the annals of military theory that they obscure the substantial contributions of those thinkers who came after him. This is especially true for those German theorists who wrote during the half century preceding World War I. However, as Antulio Echevarria argues, although none of those thinkers approached Clausewitz's stature, they were nonetheless theorists of considerable vision. The Kaiser's theorists have long been portrayed as narrow-minded thinkers wedded to an outmoded way of war, little altered since Napoleon's time. According to this view, they ignored or simply failed to understand how industrialization and modernization had transformed the conduct of war. They seemed unaware of how numerous advances in technology and weaponry had so increased the power of the defensive that decisive victory had become virtually impossible.
But Echevarria disputes this traditional view and convincingly shows that these theorists--Boguslawski, Goltz, Schlieffen, Hoenig, and their American and European counterparts--were not the architects of outmoded theories. In fact, they duly appreciated the implications of the vast advances in modern weaponry (as well as in transportation and communications) and set about finding solutions that would restore offensive maneuver to the battlefield.
Among other things, they underscored the emerging need for synchronizing concentrated firepower with rapid troop movements, as well as the need for a decentralized command scheme in order to cope with the greater tempo, lethality, and scope of modern warfare. In effect, they redefined the essential relations among the combined arms of infantry, artillery, and cavalry.
Echevarria goes on to suggest that attempts to apply new military theories and doctrine were uneven due to deficiencies in training and an overall lack of interest in theory among younger officers. It is this failure of application, more than the theories themselves, that are responsible for the ruinous slaughter of World War I.
This book is part of the Modern War Studies series.”
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“The revised edition of this highly successful text provides a clear and accessible introduction to some of the most important questions of political philosophy. Organized around major issues, Wolff provides the structure that beginners need, while also introducing some distinctive ideas of his own.”
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“Colin S. Gray has advised governments on both sides of the Atlantic about military affairs, and he looks into the future to provide some intriguing answers about the ways Western armed forces—which have traditionally been trained to fight conventional, not guerrilla, warfare—may have to evolve.”
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Strategy & Strategic History
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“Anticipating Surprise, originally written as a manual for training intelligence analysts during the cold war, has been declassified and condensed, in order to provide wider audiences with an inside look at intelligence gathering and analysis. Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on America, intelligence collection and analysis has been hotly debated. Cynthia Grabo suggests ways of improving warning assessments which better convey warnings to policymakers and military commanders - who are responsible for taking appropriate action to avert disaster.”
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“This book presents an accessible introduction to Aristotle's "Politics" - a classic of political theory, widely considered to be the founding text of Western political science. In the "Politics", Aristotle sets out to discover what is the best form that the state can take. Similar to his mentor Plato, Aristotle considers the form that will produce justice and cultivate the highest human potential; however Aristotle takes a more empirical approach, examining the constitution of existing states and drawing on specific case-studies. In doing so he lays the foundations of modern political science. This Reader's Guide is the ideal companion to this most influential of texts. "Continuum Reader's Guides" are clear, concise and accessible introductions to key texts in literature and philosophy. Each book explores the themes, context, criticism and influence of key works, providing a practical introduction to close reading, guiding students towards a thorough understanding of the text. They provide an essential, up-to-date resource, ideal for undergraduate students.”
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“No review available. Submit a review of 'Battle Studies' to Infinity Journal.”
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“Review by Amazon: Novelist and retired army officer Peters gathers his recent short nonfiction in a useful and occasionally abrasive book focusing on the international climate for terrorism--where it comes from, where it may go besides the U.S., why Americans are a prime target (he doesn't believe much in American guilt), and what should be done to reduce American vulnerability. Some op-ed-style pieces take up such collateral subjects as American willingness to accept casualties in low-intensity combat and the absence of sinister fascist tendencies among army officers. Peters rises to conservative patriotic peroration in the pieces written during the three months after 9-11, and he exhibits distastes for the Clinton administration and for intellectuals, foreign and domestic, that will make parts of the book unreadable for some. Basically this is good, intelligent stuff, though Peters' predilections sometimes obscure its merits.
Roland Green. Copyright © American Library Association. All rights reserved --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.”
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“Amazon: On a hot and dusty summer's day in 216 BC, the forces of the Carthaginian general Hannibal faced the Roman army in a dramatic encounter at Cannae. Massively outnumbered, the Carthaginians nevertheless won an astonishing victory - one that left more than 50,000 men dead.
Gregory Daly's enthralling study considers the reasons that led the two armies to the field of battle, and why each followed the course that they did when they got there. It explores in detail the composition of the armies, and the tactics and leadership methods of the opposing generals. Finally, by focusing on the experiences of those who fought, Daly gives an unparalleled portrait of the true horror and chaos of ancient warfare. This striking and vivid account is the fullest yet of the bloodiest battle in ancient history.”
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“Examines and applies Carl von Clausewitz's idea of friction in war in the context of current U.S. military policy making and war.”
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“While many scholars agree that Clausewitz's On War is frequently misunderstood, almost none have explored his methodology to see whether it might enhance our understanding of his concepts. This book lays out Clausewitz's methodology in a brisk and straightforward style. It then uses that as a basis for understanding his contributions to the ever growing body of knowledge of war. The specific contributions this study addresses are Clausewitz's theories concerning the nature of war, the relationship between war and politics, and several of the major principles of strategy he examined.
These theories and principles lie at the heart of the current debates over the nature of contemporary conflict. They also underpin much of the instruction that prepares military and civilian leaders for their roles in the development and execution of military strategy. Thus, they are important even in circles where Clausewitz is only briefly studied. While understanding On War is no more a prerequisite for winning wars than knowledge is a requirement for exercising power, Clausewitz's opus has become something of an authoritative reference for those desiring to expand their knowledge of war. By linking method and concept, this book contributes significantly to that end.”
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“This intellectual history examines the reception of Carl von Clausewitz's military theories in Britain and the United States. In the first comprehensive study of the literature, Christopher Bassford argues that the impact of Clausewitzian theory has been underestimated and he follows the trail of Clausewitzian influence from pre-1873 Britain to 1945. Bassford finds that among those who explicitly discussed Clausewitz and his theories were soldiers, journalists, historians, political scientists and propagandists. In bringing this literature to light, Clausewitz in English makes a persuasive case for Clausewitzian theory having a major impact on the broad development of the British and American military thinking. It will be of interest to a wide range of military and intellectual historians.”
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“Perhaps the most important book on military strategy ever written, Carl von Clausewitz’s On War has influenced generations of generals and politicians, has been blamed for the unprecedented death tolls in the First and Second World Wars, and is required reading at military academies to this day. But On War, which was never finished and was published posthumously, is obscure and fundamentally contradictory. What Clausewitz declares in book 1, he discounts in book 8. The language is confusing and the relevance not always clear. It is an extremely difficult book for the general reader to approach, to reconcile with itself, and to place in context. Hew Strachan, one of the world’s foremost military historians answers these problems. He explains how and why On War was written, elucidates what Clausewitz meant, and offers insight into the book’s continuing significance. This is a must read for fans of military history.”
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“Review from Reed Business: Former National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Kissinger discusses the art of diplomacy and the American approach to foreign affairs.
Copyright 1995 Reed Business Information, Inc.”
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“This original book presents a global approach to eighteenth century warfare. Emphasis is placed on the importance of conflict in the period and the capacity for decisiveness in impact and development in method. Through this Jeremy Black extends the view beyond land to naval conflict.
European Warfare in a Global Context offers a comparative approach, in the sense of considering Western developments alongside those elsewhere, furthermore it puts emphasis on conflict between Western and non-western powers. This approach necessarily reconsiders developments within the West, but also offers a shift in emphasis from standard narrative of the latter.
This book is the ideal study of warfare for all students.”
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“Strategy in this book covers all military activity. The broad purpose is to show how strategy works, using air power and special operations as substantial case studies, but also addressing sea power, nuclear deterrence and information warfare. Although the book comments on the future of air power, the reliability of non-nuclear deterrence, the character of joint warfare, the utility of special warriors, and the limitations of excellence in information warfare, the primary intention is to deepen the understanding of the nature and working of strategy and strategic effect.”
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“This classic in the field of military history covers weaponry from Archimedes' catapult down to MIRV and the ABM, emphasizes the contributions of science to warfare, and includes an extensive new chapter on the weapons of the nuclear age.”
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“In what he feels is a generalizable case study of civil-military relations in democratic countries, Peri (political sociology and communication, Tel Aviv U., Israel) examines the influence of the Israeli Defense Forces over national policy from the 1990s to the present. He counters claims that the IDF is merely an instrument of policy, presenting a...”
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“Review: Steve Coll's Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 offers revealing details of the CIA's involvement in the evolution of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the years before the September 11 attacks. From the beginning, Coll shows how the CIA's on-again, off-again engagement with Afghanistan after the end of the Soviet war left officials at Langley with inadequate resources and intelligence to appreciate the emerging power of the Taliban. He also demonstrates how Afghanistan became a deadly playing field for international politics where Soviet, Pakistani, and U.S. agents armed and trained a succession of warring factions. At the same time, the book, though opinionated, is not solely a critique of the agency. Coll balances accounts of CIA failures with the success stories, like the capture of Mir Amal Kasi. Coll, managing editor for the Washington Post, covered Afghanistan from 1989 to 1992. He demonstrates unprecedented access to records of White House meetings and to formerly classified material, and his command of Saudi, Pakistani, and Afghani politics is impressive. He also provides a seeming insider's perspective on personalities like George Tenet, William Casey, and anti-terrorism czar, Richard Clarke ("who seemed to wield enormous power precisely because hardly anyone knew who he was or what exactly he did for a living"). Coll manages to weave his research into a narrative that sometimes has the feel of a Tom Clancy novel yet never crosses into excess. While comprehensive, Coll's book may be hard going for those looking for a direct account of the events leading to the 9-11 attacks. The CIA's 1998 engagement with bin Laden as a target for capture begins a full two-thirds of the way into Ghost Wars, only after a lengthy march through developments during the Carter, Reagan, and early Clinton Presidencies. But this is not a critique of Coll's efforts; just a warning that some stamina is required to keep up. Ghost Wars is a complex study of intelligence operations and an invaluable resource for those seeking a nuanced understanding of how a small band of extremists rose to inflict incalculable damage on American soil. --Patrick O'Kelley --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.”
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“Examines how the US, the Soviet Union and various European powers have developed their "grand Strategies" - how they have integrated their political, economic and military goals in order to preserve their long-term interests in times of war and peace.”
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“Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), "the miracle of Holland," was famous as a child prodigy, theologian, historian, Dutch political figure, escaped political prisoner, and finally as Sweden's Ambassador to France. Addressing his contribution to international relations, this book critically reappraises Grotius' thought, comparing it to his predecessors and examining it in the context of the wars and controversies of his time. The collection illuminates enduring problems of international relations: the nature of international society and its institutions, the equality of states, restraints in war, collective security, military intervention, the rights of the individuals, and the law of the sea.”
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“Review from Publishers Weekly: According to Keegan (The First World War), there is a good reason why "military intelligence" is so often described as an oxymoron: inflicting and enduring destruction often has no room for reflection, just retaliation. But retaliation tends toward attrition, and attrition is expensive; thought, for Keegan, offers a means of reducing war's price, taking commanders and armies inside enemy decision-action loops, helping identify enemy weakness, warning of enemy intentions or disclosing enemy strategy. Keegan offers a series of case studies in the operational significance of intelligence, ranging from Admiral Nelson's successful pursuit of the French fleet in 1805, through Stonewall Jackson's possession of detailed local knowledge in his 1862 Shenandoah Valley campaign, to the employment of electronic intelligence in the naval operations of WWI and its extension and refinement during WWII. For that conflict, Keegan expands his analysis, discussing intelligence aspects of the German invasion of Crete, the U.S. victory at Midway and the defeat of the U-boats in the Battle of the Atlantic. To balance an account heavily focused on technology, he incorporates a chapter on the importance of human intelligence in providing information on the Nazi V-weapons. Keegan concludes with a discussion of post-1945 military intelligence that stresses the difference between a Cold War in which the central targets of intelligence gathering were susceptible to concrete, scientific methods, and more recent targets that, lacking form and organization, require penetration through understanding. That paradigm shift in turn is part of Keegan's general argument that intelligence data does not guarantee success. This book shows that the British need not have lost on Crete; that the American victory at Midway was not predetermined. At a time when armed forces tout the "information revolution," Keegan writes in the belief that the outcomes of war are ultimately the result of fighting.”
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Intelligence
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“John Keegan, whose many books, including classic histories of the two world wars, have confirmed him as the premier miltary historian of our time, here presents a masterly look at the value and limitations of intelligence in the conduct of war.
Intelligence gathering is an immensely complicated and vulnerable endeavor. And it often fails. Until the invention of the telegraph and radio, information often traveled no faster than a horse could ride, yet intelligence helped defeat Napoleon. In the twentieth century, photo analysts didn’t recognize Germany’s V-2 rockets for what they were; on the other hand, intelligence helped lead to victory over the Japanese at Midway. In Intelligence in War, John Keegan illustrates that only when paired with force has military intelligence been an effective tool, as it may one day be in besting al-Qaeda.”
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“A comprehensive history of all three of Israel's intelligence services, from their origins in the 1930s to the present, chronicles the mistakes and the triumphs of their three spy services, including the raid on Entebbe.”
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“Description by The Economist: "Low Intensity Operations is an important, controversial and prophetic book that has had a major influence on the conduct of modern warfare. First published in 1971, it was the result of an academic year Frank Kitson spent at University College, Oxford, under the auspices of the Ministry of Defence, to write a paper on the way in which the army should be prepared to deal with future insurgency and peacekeeping operations. In his foreword, General Sir Michael Carver wrote with percipience ‘The necessity for the integration of intelligence and operations is his most important lesson and the one least appreciated by the conventional soldier. Frank Kitson’s great virtue is that his above all a realist, in spite of being both an idealist and enthusiast. The reader will not finding these pages a purely academic theoretical exercise. He will, however, find something stimulating and original suggestions about the tasks which confront the Army in the field of ‘’low intensity operations’’ and about the methods which should be used both to prepare for and execute them.’ For too long unavailable in the U. K. this ground-breaking work is as pertinent now as it was when first published; one only has to think of Afghanistan and Iraq to appreciate the sad truth of that. 'To understand the nature of revolutionary warfare, one cannot do better than read Low Intensity Operations . . . The author has had unrivalled experience of such operations in many parts of the world.' Daily Telegraph 'A highly practical analysis of subversion, insurgency and peacekeeping operations . . . Frank Kitson's book is not merely timely but important."”
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“Review from Library Journal: Makers of Modern Strategy , first pub lished in 1943, deserved and demanded updating. The 28 essays in the new vol ume7 more than in the original range from excellent to outstanding. They reflect the skills of a cross-section of leading military historians. But re viving a classic is a difficult task. Some original contributions were discarded, some rewritten, some left virtually in tact. Old and new frequently coexist awkwardly, as when Hajo Holbom and Gunther Rothenberg compete for 19th- century Germany. The editors' reluc tance to impose a common format add ed to an intellectual diffusion most visible in a split between biographic and thematic approaches. As a result, this revision cannot equal its predecessor's status as a standard text. As an antholo gy, however, the work is brilliantly suc cessfuland that is no mean achieve ment. Recommended for all students of military history. Dennis Showalter, History Dept., Colorado Coll., Colorado Springs. Copyright 1986 Reed Business Information, Inc.”
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“The United States Marine Corps is the largest such force on the planet, and yet it is the smallest, most elite section of the U.S. military, one with a long and storied history. Here, in the most current version of the manual used by the Corps itself, is the Marine guide to winning in combat. Learn battle-tested techniques for: . tactical indecisiveness . exploiting the environment . developing an ambush mentality . anticipation and improvisation . maintaining combat discipline . building on advantage . and more. Military buffs, war-gamers, and anyone seeking to understand the role the American military is playing on an increasingly complicated global stage will find this a fascinating and informative document.”
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“This is the first comprehensive study based on a detailed textual analysis of the classical works on war by Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao Tse-tung, and to a lesser extent, Jomini and Machiavelli. Brushing stereotypes aside, the author takes a fresh look at what these strategic thinkers actually said—not what they are widely believed to have said. He finds that despite their apparent differences in terms of time, place, cultural background, and level of material/technological development, all had much more in common than previously supposed. In fact, the central conclusion of this book is that the logic of waging war and of strategic thinking is as universal and timeless as human nature itself.
This third, revised and expanded edition includes five new chapters and some new charts and diagrams.”
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“Review by Richard Betts (Columbia University): 'Stephen Biddle's Military Power is one of the most important contributions to strategic studies in recent decades. Presenting a very powerful case for a very surprising argument on a very important question, it will be controversial in some quarters, but critics will be hard-pressed to refute the case'.”
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“Excerpt from introduction: Wylie came to be interested in abstract theory gradually, through experience and observation during his naval career. Wylie's book, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control, was clearly a product of his experience and his professional development as a naval officer. Looking back over his career, one can find in it the ideas and thought processes that led him to write the book.”
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“Modern Strategy explains the permanent nature, but ever changing character, of strategy in light of the whole strategic experience of the twentieth century. The book is a major contribution to the general theory of strategy; it makes sense of the strategic history of the twentieth century, and provides understanding of what that strategic history implies for the century to come.
The book offers a uniquely comprehensive analysis of the different facets of modern strategy. The classic writings of Carl von Clausewitz are reconsidered for their continuing relevance, while possible successors are appraised. In addition to arguing that Clausewitz figured out what strategy was, and how it worked, the book probes deeply into strategy's political, ethical, and cultural dimension. The book explains how strategic behaviour in the twentieth century has expanded from the two-dimensional world of the land and the surface of the sea, to include the ocean depths, the air, space, and most recently the 'cyberspace' environments. It also offers details analyses both of nuclear matters and of the realm of irregular violence.
This is the first comprehensive account of all aspects of modern strategy since the Cold War ended and will be essential reading for all students of modern strategy and security studies.”
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“Clausewitz is often quoted but more often misunderstood. On Clausewitz presents his central ideas about war and politics - such as war as an instrument of policy, the concept of Absolute War, friction and the fog of war - in a clear and systematic fashion. It also presents the man, his life and the military and intellectual environment in which he produced his great work On War. A final section considers Clausewitz's relevance to the rapidly changing nature of war today.”
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“Translated and with an introduction by Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith USMC Retired. One of the most influential documents of our time, Mao Tse-tung's pamphlet on guerrilla warfare has become the basic textbook for waging revolution in underdeveloped and emergent areas throughout the world. Recognizing the fundamental disparity between agrarian and urban societies, Mao advocated unorthodox strategies that converted deficits into advantages: using intelligence provided by the sympathetic peasant population; substituting deception, mobility, and surprise for superior firepower; using retreat as an offensive move; and educating the inhabitants on the ideological basis of the struggle. This radical new approach to warfare, waged in jungles and mountains by mobile guerrilla bands closely supported by local inhabitants, has been adopted by other revolutionary leaders from Ho Chi Minh to Che Guevara. Mao wrote On Guerrilla Warfare in 1937 while in retreat after ten years of battling the Nationalist army of Chiang Kai-shek. Twelve years later, the Nationalist Chinese were rousted from the mainland, and Mao consolidated his control of a new nation, having put his theories of revolutionary guerrilla warfare to the test. Established governments have slowly come to recognize the need to understand and devise means to counter this new method of warfare. Samuel B. Griffith's classic translation makes Mao's treatise widely available and includes a comprehensive introduction that profiles Mao, analyzes the nature and conduct of guerrilla warfare, and considers its implications for American policy.”
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“Summer's inspired analysis of America's war in Vietnam answers the most pressing questions remaining from that terrible conflict more than a decade before Robert McNamara's painful admissions.”
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“On War is the most significant attempt in Western history to understand war, both in its internal dynamics and as an instrument of policy. Since the work's first appearance in 1832, it has been read throughout the world, and has stimulated generations of soldiers, statesmen, and intellectuals.”
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“This book at last makes available a penetrating exchange between two of history's most famous soldiers concerning the dramatic events of the Waterloo campaign of 1815. The Duke of Wellington is considered one of the greatest military commanders in British history; General Carl von Clausewitz is often seen as the greatest military thinker in the history of Western civilization. Both men were prominent participants in the campaign of 1815. Wellington commanded the Anglo-Allied army, while the much younger Clausewitz was chief-of-staff of the Prussian 3rd Corps. Wellington went on to become prime minister of Great Britain and commander-in-chief-for-life of the British Army. Clausewitz went on to write Vom Kriege (On War), a seminal and still hotly debated treatise on the theory and philosophy of war. Via the works of his disciple, military historian Hans Delbrück, he also became the founder of modern, "scientific" military history.
Despite considerable interest in Clausewitz in Britain and America, Wellington's once-famous response to Clausewitz was largely ignored by historians of Waterloo writing in English after 1914, and no efforts were made to publish a translation of Clausewitz's original campaign study before this project was launched in the 1990s. Hence the importance of this book's examination of the exchange of ideas between these two famous soldiers. It contains Wellington's official 1815 report on the battle of Waterloo; two of Clausewitz's post-battle letters to his wife; previously unpublished correspondence within Wellington's circle discussing Clausewitz's work; a completely new translation of Clausewitz's strategic analysis of the entire campaign (including for the first time the rare maps to which he refers); Wellington's detailed 1842 essay--the only serious essay Wellington ever wrote on the subject--responding to Clausewitz's analysis; and analytical essays by prominent experts on Clausewitz, Wellington, and Waterloo. This book makes clear the importance of grasping the views of these two famous participants and will be of great interest to readers wishing to learn more about the Battle of Waterloo, the campaign of 1815, the development of Clausewitz's thinking on war and military history, Clausewitz's evaluation of key command decisions, and Wellington's reactions to Clausewitz's analysis and criticisms. (edited by author)”
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“From introduction: Before Clausewitz left Prussia in 1812 to join the Russian army and resist Napoleon, he prepared an essay on war to leave with the sixteen year-old Prussian Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm (later King Friedrich Wilhelm IV, r.1840-1858), whose military tutor he had become in 1810. This essay was called "The most important principles of the art of war to complete my course of instruction for his Royal Highness the Crown Prince" ["Die wichtigsten Grundsätze des Kriegführens zur Ergänzung meines Unterrichts bei Sr. Königlichen Hoheit dem Kronprinzen"]. This essay is usually referred to as the "Principles of War." It represented Clausewitz's theoretical development up to that point, translated into a form suitable for his young student. Unfortunately, it has often been treated as a summary of Clausewitz's mature theory—which it most emphatically is not. Rather, it is only a primitive precursor to his later magnum opus—On War. Its subject matter is largely tactical. While some of the more important theoretical concepts of On War are fairly well-developed ("friction," for example), many are embryonic and others entirely absent. In particular, and in great contrast to the later work, "Principles of War" is not notably sophisticated in historical terms. It is based almost entirely on the experience of Frederick the Great and the wars with revolutionary France and Napoleon prior to 1812.
The translation reproduced here was done by Hans Gatzke in 1942. A German protestant, Gatzke (1915-87) emigrated to America in 1937. He graduated from Williams College in 1938 and got his master's degree from Harvard the following year. He then taught at Harvard, ultimately receiving his doctorate there in 1947. From 1944 to 1946, however, he was a second lieutenant in the U.S. Army, serving with Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF). He taught at Johns Hopkins from 1947 to 1964 and then moved to Yale.”
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“One of the most cogent and respected strategic theorists in today's military sounds the alarm: We have no viable doctrine for tomorrow's war.”
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“Roman Warfare surveys the history of Rome's fighting forces from their inception in the 7th century BCE to the fall of the Western Empire in the 5th century CE. In non-technical, lively language, Jonathan Roth examines the evolution of Roman war over its thousand-year history. He highlights the changing arms and equipment of the soldiers, unit organization and command structure, and the wars and battles of each era. The military narrative is used as a context for Rome's changing tactics and strategy and to discuss combat techniques, logistics, and other elements of Roman war. Political, social, and economic factors are also considered. Full of detail, up-to-date on current scholarly debates, and richly illustrated with 39 halftones and 27 color plates, Roman Warfare is intended for students of the ancient world and military history.”
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“The United States Marine Corps is the largest such force on the planet, and yet it is the smallest, most elite section of the U.S. military, one with a long and storied history. This classic 1940 official government report, created by the Corps, laid the groundwork for the "small wars" fought by the United States in the post-World War II era, and has been used to strategize the American occupation of Iraq in the early 21st century. • What is a small war? • What is the nature of operations for such a conflict? • What kind of staffing does a small war require? • What logistical and training issues need to be taken into account? • What is the importance of neutral zones? • How do tactics differ in a small war? • How should an occupying force disarm a civilian population? • and more Military buffs, wargamers, and anyone seeking to understand fundamental military strategy will find this a fascinating and informative document.”
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“At the end of a century dominated by global conflict - and despite the unchanging nature of the human suffering it causes - the nature of war itself, argues Colin McInnes, has been transformed. McInnes considers the key developments that have led to this metamorphosis: the possibility of a major war in the West has become remote, and the limited Cold War conflicts in which superpower rivalries were played out have been succeeded by local conflicts with little or no potential for escalation. There has been a change in the relationship between war and society, with wars now fought by specialized professionals and viewed from a safe distance on television. Simultaneously, technological developments have made it easier for Western states to minimize the risks to their combatants, keeping casualities at a level that their citizens will tolerate. War, in short, has entered a new era. For only a small minority in the West does it have any direct meaning - it is no longer participatory for Western society as a whole, but has become for too many a kind of spectator sport. The implications of this phenomenon, for both the military and the broader community, are explored in the final chapter of the book.”
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“This new Reader brings together key essays on strategic theory by some of the leading contributors in the field.
Filling a large gap in the market, it will guide students through both the theoretical and practical aspects of Strategic Studies. Including classic essays and works of contemporary scholarship, the volume provides a wide-ranging survey of the key ideas and themes in the field of Strategic Studies. It comprises six thematic sections, each of which has an Editors’ Introduction and suggestions for further reading:
uses of strategic theory
interpretation of the classics
instruments of war: land, sea, and air power
nuclear strategy
irregular warfare and small wars
future warfare, future strategy
Striking a balance between theoretical essays and case studies, the Strategic Studies Reader will be essential reading for all students of strategic studies, international security and modern warfare, as well as for professional military students.”
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“In this volume, Professor Colin Gray develops and applies the theory and scholarship on the allegedly historical practice of the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA), in order to improve our comprehension of how and why strategy 'works'.
The author explores the RMA hypothesis both theoretically and historically. The book argues that the conduct of an RMA has to be examined as a form of strategic behaviour, which means that, of necessity, it must "work" as strategy works. The great RMA debate of the 1990s is reviewed empathetically, though sceptically, by the author, with every major school of thought allowed its day in court.
The author presents three historical RMAs as case studies for his argument: those arguably revealed in the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon; in World War I; and in the nuclear age. The focus of his analysis is how these grand RMAs functioned strategically. The conclusions that he draws from these empirical exercises are then applied to help us understand what, indeed, is - and what is not - happening with the much vaunted information-technology-led RMA of today.”
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“This book examines the strategies pursued by the Colonies and the other combatants in the American War for Independence, placing the conflict in its proper global context.
Many do not realize the extent to which the 1775 colonial rebellion against British rule escalated into a global conflict. Collectively, this volume examines the strategies pursued by the American Colonies, Great Britain, France, Spain, and Holland, and the League of Armed Neutrality, placing the military, naval, and diplomatic elements of the struggle in their proper global context. Moreover, assessing how each nation prosecuted their respective wars provides lessons for current students of strategic studies and military and naval history.
This book will be of great interest to students of strategic studies, American history, Military History and political science in general.”
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“The most comprehensive analysis of strategic studies available, Strategy in the Contemporary World, Third Edition, reflects upon recent events and assesses the role of military power in the contemporary world. Taking a functional approach and looking at issues from both times of war and of peace, editors John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, and Colin S. Gray analyze the conflicts themselves--as well as what can be learned from them. This new edition covers topics such as intelligence and strategy, strategic studies and its critics, as well as strategy in practice, providing a comprehensive and insightful collection of contributions from a team of leading experts in the field.”
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“Strategy in the Missile Age was written during the dawn of the nuclear age, when the advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles necessitated a massive rethinking of military strategy and power. Originally published in 1959, it retains ample relevance today for its discussion of the origins of air power, its cornerstone position in the evolution of Cold War era nuclear strategy, and its treatment of preventive and preemptive attacks, deterrence, and the economics of strategy. Brodie, who believed nuclear war was “unthinkable,” thought much about the unthinkable and helped provide an intellectual framework for avoiding a nuclear catastrophe. Nearly fifty years after its initial publication, and to celebrate RAND’s 60th Anniversary, RAND is proud to bring this classic work back into print in paperback and digital formats.”
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“This is the classic book on war as we know it. During his long life, Basil H. Liddell Hart was considered one of the world's foremost military thinkers--a man generally regarded as the "Clausewitz of the 20th century."
Liddell Hart stressed movement, flexibilty, surprise. He saw that in most military campaigns dislocation of the enemy's psychological and physical balance is prelude to victory. This dislocation results from a strategic indirect approach. Reflect for a moment on the results of direct confrontation (trench war in WW I) versus indirect dislocation (Blitzkreig in WW II). Liddell Hart is also tonic for business and political planning: just change the vocabulary and his concepts fit.”
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“The Art of War by Baron De Jomini was considered by most military experts of the day, at the time of the American Civil War, to be the definitive work on strategy and warfare. Even today, it is highly regarded as a seminal work in the development of strategy. Antoine Henri de Jomini was one of Napoleon’s most capable generals. He contributed to almost all of Napoleon’s major battles. Napoleon regarded him so highly he made him Baron De Jomini. At the close of the Napoleonic wars De Jomini became General and Aide de camp for the Tsar of Russia. His first-hand accounts and rigorous analysis of important battles is still a major resource on tactics, strategy and warfare.”
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“Drawing on a very wide range of unpublished and previously unexploited sources, Martin van Creveld examines the "nuts and bolts" of war. He considers the formidable problems of movement and supply, transportation and administration, often mentioned (but rarely explored) by the vast majority of books on military history. By concentrating on logistics rather than on the more traditional tactics and strategy, van Creveld is also able to offer an original reinterpretation of military history.”
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“Review from Publishers Weekly: Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill and David Ben Gurion what made them great wartime heads of state, according to Eliot A. Cohen (Military Misfortunes), a professor of strategic studies at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, is that they were able to finesse a relationship with their military leaders that kept the balance of power squarely in (their own) civilian hands. In his lucid study, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime, Cohen looks closely at the strategies of the four premiers and addresses broader questions about the tension between politicians and generals in a wartime democracy.”
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“Review from Brookings Institute: Long before Germany's blitzkrieg swept the West, European leaders had received many signals of its imminence. Stalin, too, had abundant warning of German designs on Russia but believed that by avoiding "provocative" defensive measures he could avert the attack that finally came in June 1941. And the stories of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Korean War, and three Arab-Israeli conflicts are replete with missed opportunities to react to unmistakable warnings. Richad K. Betts analyzes surprise attacks during the mid-twentieth century to illustrate his thesis: surprise attacks occur, not because intelligence services fail to warn, but because of the disbelief of political leaders.”
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“Review by Publisher's Weekly: As in his bestselling The 48 Laws of Power, Greene puts a modern spin on wisdom that has stood the test of history, only this time his role model is Sun Tzu rather than Machiavelli. The argument is fairly standard: despite our most noble intentions, "aggressive impulses that are impossible to ignore or repress" make military combat a fitting metaphor for getting ahead in life. Greene's advice covers everything from steeling one's mind for battle to specific defensive and offensive tactics—notably, the final section on "dirty" warfare is one of the book's longest. Historical lessons are outlined and interpreted, with amplifying quotations crammed into the margins. Not all of the examples are drawn from the battlefield; in one section, Greene skips nimbly from Lyndon Johnson's tenacity to Julius Caesar's decisiveness, from Joan Crawford's refusal to compromise to Ted Williams's competitive drive. Alfred Hitchcock, he says, embodies "the detached-Buddha tactic" of appearing uninvolved while remaining in total control. The diversity of subject matter compensates for occasional lapses into stilted warriorese ("arm yourself with prudence, and never completely lay down your arms, not even for friends"). For those willing to embrace its martial conceit, Greene's compendium offers inspiration and entertainment in equal measure. (Jan. 23) Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.”
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“...a strong and stimulating book. It has no rival in either scope or quality. For libraries, history buffs, and armchair warriors, it is a must. For political science students, career diplomats, and officers in the armed services, its reading should be required.’ – History. ‘A particularly timely account.’ -- Kansas City Times. ‘It reads easily but is not a popularized history... nor does the book become a history of battles.... Weigley's analyses and interpretations are searching, competent, and useful.”
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“Review by Foreign Affairs: 'A masterful analysis of the problem of international order in contemporary society and of the feasibility of such alternative models as disarmament, global organization, a highly proliferated world, and a radical redistribution of wealth and power.'”
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“More than 2,500 years ago, Sun Tzu composed his masterpiece The Art of War which has been used by the world's greatest leaders including Napoleon. Here, Wing makes the influential philosophies of the Orient accessible to all seekers of professional achievement and personal excellence. 20 halftones, 35 illustrations.”
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“The only political work published during Machiavelli's lifetime, The Art of War delivers political, historic, and scholarly advice through seven chapters in the form of a Socratic dialogue. In his own words, the book's purpose is "To honor and reward virtue, not to have contempt for poverty, to constrain citizens to love one another, to live without factions, and to esteem less the private than the public good."”
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“"The magnum opus of one of America's most respected military historians, "The Art of War in the Western World" has earned its place as the standard work on how the three major operational components of war - tactics, logistics, and strategy - have evolved and changed over time. This monumental work encompasses 2,500 years of military history, from infantry combat in ancient Greece through the dissolution of the Roman Empire to the Thirty Years' War and from the Napoleonic campaigns through World War II, which Jones sees as the culmination of modern warfare, to the Israeli-Egyptian War of 1973".”
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“Review from Library Journal: Concentrating on land warfare, distinguished U.S. military historian Jones argues that most military events can be explained by military factors. The framework of his analysis is strategy, which Jones sees as remaining consistent for 2500 years. When applied, however, strategy becomes dependent on tactics and logistics. These in turn are constantly modified by technology. The result is an ever-changing dialectic of options that continues to make war a viable political option even in the nuclear age. Both history on a grand scale and a provocative intellectual exercise, this ranks with Theodore Ropp's classic War in the Modern World (1959).
Dennis E. Showalter, Colorado Coll., Colorado Springs”
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“One of the most influential experts on military history and strategy has now written his magnum opus, an original and provocative account of the past hundred years of global conflict. The Changing Face of War is the book that reveals the path that led to the impasse in Iraq, why powerful standing armies are now helpless against ill-equipped insurgents, and how the security of sovereign nations may be maintained in the future.
While paying close attention to the unpredictable human element, Martin van Creveld takes us on a journey from the last century’s clashes of massive armies to today’s short, high-tech, lopsided skirmishes and frustrating quagmires. Here is the world as it was in 1900, controlled by a handful of “great powers,” mostly European, with the memories of eighteenth-century wars still fresh. Armies were still led by officers riding on horses, messages conveyed by hand, drum, and bugle. As the telegraph, telephone, and radio revolutionized communications, big-gun battleships like the British Dreadnought, the tank, and the airplane altered warfare.
Van Creveld paints a powerful portrait of World War I, in which armies would be counted in the millions, casualties–such as those in the cataclysmic battle of the Marne–would become staggering, and deadly new weapons, such as poison gas, would be introduced. Ultimately, Germany’s plans to outmaneuver her enemies to victory came to naught as the battle lines ossified and the winners proved to be those who could produce the most weapons and provide the most soldiers.
The Changing Face of War then propels us to the even greater global carnage of World War II. Innovations in armored warfare and airpower, along with technological breakthroughs from radar to the atom bomb, transformed war from simple slaughter to a complex event requiring new expertise–all in the service of savagery, from Pearl Harbor to Dachau to Hiroshima. The further development of nuclear weapons during the Cold War shifts nations from fighting wars to deterring them: The number of active troops shrinks and the influence of the military declines as civilian think tanks set policy and volunteer forces “decouple” the idea of defense from the world of everyday people.
War today, van Crevald tells us, is a mix of the ancient and the advanced, as state-of-the-art armies fail to defeat small groups of crudely outfitted guerrilla and terrorists, a pattern that began with Britain’s exit from India and culminating in American misadventures in Vietnam and Iraq, examples of what the author calls a “long, almost unbroken record of failure.”
How to learn from the recent past to reshape the military for this new challenge–how to still save, in a sense, the free world–is the ultimate lesson of this big, bold, and cautionary work. The Changing Face of War is sure to become the standard source on this essential subject.”
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“World politics is entering a new phase, in which the great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of international conflict will be cultural. Civilizations-the highest cultural groupings of people-are differentiated from each other by religion, history, language and tradition. These divisions are deep and increasing in importance. From Yugoslavia to the Middle East to Central Asia, the fault lines of civilizations are the battle lines of the future. In this emerging era of cultural conflict the United States must forge alliances with similar cultures and spread its values wherever possible. With alien civilizations the West must be accommodating if possible, but confrontational if necessary. In the final analysis, however, all civilizations will have to learn to tolerate each other.
Source: Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993”
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“The expansion and escalation of global terrorism has left populations across the world and decision-makers responsible for contending with it unprepared. This book, now in paperback, is the first attempt of its kind to create a manual of counter-terrorism measures on all the relevant operational levels. The author's main purpose is to give decision-makers the tools to make rational and effective decisions in both preventing and countering terrorism. The need to contend with terrorism can be found in almost every sphere of life: security, prevention and suppression of terrorism, legal and ethical dilemmas regarding democratic issues, such as the individual's human rights, intelligence interrogations, the right of the public to know, as well as coping with social, psychological, and mediarelated issues.”
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“From Publisher's Weekly: 'Starred Review. Hebrew University's van Creveld remains unsurpassed as a scholar of war. In this provocative volume, he challenges perhaps the subject's single greatest shibboleth—at least in Western culture. Since the Enlightenment, war has been described as a means to an end, serving essentially rational interests. Nothing, van Creveld asserts, could be further from the truth: war exercises a powerful fascination in its own right. To dismiss this is to overlook that war has generated a distinctive culture, from uniforms to war games to parades, that is despised and regularly denigrated as atavistic and irrational. Van Creveld demonstrates that war is an essential element of history, rooted in psychology. In a tour de force of scholarship and insight, he takes readers through the processes of preparing for, waging and commemorating war. That culture makes men face death willingly, even enthusiastically, because it is an end in itself. [T]o be of any use, the culture of war must be useless. Its traditions and rules are not constructions, but part of the fighter's soul—and as such, for better and worse, part of the human condition.'”
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“Britain's military forces have rarely been busier. Therefore, it is vitally important - both in terms of the development of British foreign and security policy and also in relation to the wider impact on international security, more generally - to understand the developing trends and underlying assumptions of British Defence Policy. This volume places policy developments in a post-11 September context and assesses the impact of such events on key aspects of the defence policy spectrum, notably the perennial concern of military overstretch. By critically appraising contemporary developments and examining what is the driving policy in specific cases, this volume provides a relevant and up-to-date assessment of this vital policy area. In addition, as well as being contemporary in its analysis, it also provides a more comprehensive assessment, embracing both policy objectives - such as the expeditionary strategy and the desire to be a bridge between the United States (US) and EU - and the instruments that underpin such an approach.”
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“This book examines how the United States uses limited military force and other means to influence adversaries and potential adversaries. It reviews when limited force can and cannot work and examines a range of current challenges, including those of guerrilla groups or minor powers armed with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. It also looks at the complications arising from domestic politics and the difficulties of using force in an alliance.”
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“From Publisher's Weekly: 'Since 9/11, Davis, director of the Hoover Institution's group on military history and contemporary conflict, has emerged as a major commentator on war making and politics. This anthology brings together 13 of Hanson's essays and reviews, revised and re-edited. They have appeared over the past decade in periodicals from the American Spectator to the New York Times. Hanson's introductory generalization that war is a human enterprise that seems inseparable from the human condition structures such subjects as an eloquent answer to the question Why Study War? a defense of the historicity of the film 300, about the Persian Wars, in a masterpiece of envelope pushing, and a comprehensive and dazzling analysis of why America fights as she does. He explains why, though a lesser historian than Thucydides, Xenophon retains a timeless attraction and analyzes war and democracy in light of America's decreasing willingness to intervene in places like Rwanda or Darfur. The pieces are well written, sometimes elegantly so, and closely reasoned. They address familiar material from original and stimulating perspectives. Hanson's arguments may not convince everyone, but cannot be dismissed. His critics and admirers will be pleased to have these pieces available under one cover.'”
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“Review from Publishers Weekly: One of the leading historians of WWI offers this superior one-volume version of his massive projected three-volume work, the first volume of which, To Arms, clocked in at 1250-plus pages last year. Strachan strenuously avoids the traditional focus on the Western Front (and the British) and the conventional assumptions of generals' stupidity and soldiers' valor. The war as he sees it was a race among generals on all sides to create new weapons and tactics faster than their opponents, a race that the Triple Entente won. It was also a race among soldiers to fight with these new weapons and tactics instead of raw courage and numbers wherever possible. Yet Russia and the Dual Monarchy of the Austro-Hungarian Empire were totally unfit for a large modern war (one reason the czar and his empire fell in 1917) and were a source of fatal weakness to Germany's alliance even before Italy changed sides. The political background (including the rising consciousness of colonial nationalities conscripted for the war), social consequences and diplomatic finagling all face an equal amount of revision, leaving the book organized more thematically than chronologically. Readers already familiar with the sequence of events in strict order will benefit most. But all readers will eventually be gripped, and even the most seasoned ones will praise the insights and the original choice of illustrations. This is likely to be the most indispensable one-volume work on the subject since John Keegan's First World War, and will draw serious readers to the larger work.
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc.”
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“Of the tens of thousands of books exploring virtually every aspect of the Civil War, surprisingly little has been said about what was in fact the determining factor in the outcome of the conflict: differences in Union and Southern strategy. In The Grand Design, Donald Stoker provides a comprehensive and often surprising account of strategy as it evolved between Fort Sumter and Appomattox. Reminding us that strategy is different from tactics (battlefield deployments) and operations (campaigns conducted in pursuit of a strategy), Stoker examines how Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis identified their political goals and worked with their generals to craft the military means to achieve them--or how they often failed to do so. Stoker shows that Davis, despite a West Point education and experience as Secretary of War, failed as a strategist by losing control of the political side of the war. His invasion of Kentucky was a turning point that shifted the loyalties and vast resources of the border states to the Union. Lincoln, in contrast, evolved a clear strategic vision, but he failed for years to make his generals implement it. At the level of generalship, Stoker notes that Robert E. Lee correctly determined the Union's center of gravity, but proved mistaken in his assessment of how to destroy it. Stoker also presents evidence that the Union could have won the war in 1862, had it followed the grand plan of the much-derided general, George B. McClellan. Historians have often argued that the North's advantages in population and industry ensured certain victory. In The Grand Design, Stoker reasserts the centrality of the overarching military ideas--the strategy--on each side, arguing convincingly that it was strategy that determined the war's outcome.”
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“In this book, the distinguished writer Edward Luttwak presents the grand strategy of the eastern Roman empire we know as Byzantine, which lasted more than twice as long as the more familiar western Roman empire, eight hundred years by the shortest definition. This extraordinary endurance is all the more remarkable because the Byzantine empire was favored neither by geography nor by military preponderance. Yet it was the western empire that dissolved during the fifth century. The Byzantine empire so greatly outlasted its western counterpart because its rulers were able to adapt strategically to diminished circumstances, by devising new ways of coping with successive enemies. It relied less on military strength and more on persuasion—to recruit allies, dissuade threatening neighbors, and manipulate potential enemies into attacking one another instead. Even when the Byzantines fought—which they often did with great skill—they were less inclined to destroy their enemies than to contain them, for they were aware that today’s enemies could be tomorrow’s allies. Born in the fifth century when the formidable threat of Attila’s Huns were deflected with a minimum of force, Byzantine strategy continued to be refined over the centuries, incidentally leaving for us several fascinating guidebooks to statecraft and war.
The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire is a broad, interpretive account of Byzantine strategy, intelligence, and diplomacy over the course of eight centuries that will appeal to scholars, classicists, military history buffs, and professional soldiers.”
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“New York Review of Books: 'Luttwak has done scholarship an immense service... Every page brings detailed insights into the working of Roman military organization, in strategy and tactics.'”
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“From the New York Review of Books: 'Luttwak has done scholarship an immense service... Every page brings detailed insights into the working of Roman military organization, in strategy and tactics.'”
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“Warfare is hugely important. At times the fates of nations, and even continents, rests on the outcome of war and thus on how its practitioners consider war. The Human Face of War is a new exploration of military thought. It starts with the observation that much military thought is poorly developed - often incoherent, riddled with paradox and at times almost mythological. The author contends that what is missing from British and American writing on warfare is any underpinning mental approach or philosophy. Why are some tank commanders, snipers, fighter pilots or submarine commanders far more effective than others? Why are many generals sacked at the outbreak of war? Why are armoured divisions twice as large today as they were during the Second World War? The Human Face of War examines these and similar phenomena, and seeks to explain them. The author argues that military thought should be based on an approach which reflects the nature of conflict and, in particular, combat. Combat - fighting - is primarily a human phenomenon. It is dominated by human behaviour in ways which practitioners intuitively accept, but have largely failed to enunciate. The book explores some of those human issues and their practical consequences. It uses a generally empirical but historically-based approach to consider aspects of operational analysis and the behavioural sciences. The Human Face of War calls for, and suggests, a new way of considering war and warfare.”
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“Review from Amazon: Alfred Thayer Mahan, an instructor at the end of the 19th century at the US Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, was the son of another important instructor of US officers, Dennis Hart Mahan, an instructor at the US Military Academy at West Point. Alfred T. Mahan's 'Influence of Seapower' is one of the most important and influential works in naval strategy. Even today, debate persists about its theories and interpretations. If you are seriously studying naval warfare it is essential and inevitable to read this work, whether you agree or not with the conclusions.”
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“As a British Gurkha officer assigned to the jungle borders of North Borneo, John Mackinlay experienced firsthand the Maoist-style insurgencies of the 1950s and 1960s, and later in his career, as a scholar researching Muslim NGOs and preventative security, he witnessed the transformation of territorial, labor-intensive uprisings into the international networks of individuals and communities that operate across the world today. In this book, Mackinlay focuses on the situation in Afghanistan to see how threats from one theater of operation impact on us domestically in the UK and in the US. Mackinlay maps the transformation of insurgencies against the rapid modernization of their origin cities, noting the ways in which technology has accelerated and complicated a variety of coalitions and the efforts to defeat them. Our current bin Laden era, Mackinlay argues, must be understood from a Maoist perspective of insurgency. The campaigns of mid-century are directly linked to the global movements of tomorrow, yet the past two decades of insurgent activity have also marked a new chapter in the practice, in which propaganda of the deed (ie, suicide bombings) has become centrally important. This shift presents new challenges to our traditional, time-honored response to terror and places a greater emphasis on mastering the virtual, cyber-based dimension of these campaigns. Mackinlay revisits the roots of global insurgencies, describes their nature and character, reveals the power of mass communications and grievance, and recommends how individual nations can counter these threats by focusing on domestic terrorism.”
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“Respected military analyst Anthony H. Cordesman provides the first in-depth analysis of the second war against Saddam Hussein's regime”
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“There has been a great deal of speculation recently concerning the likely impact of the 'Information Age' on warfare. In this vein, much of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) literature subscribes to the idea that the Information Age will witness a transformation in the very nature of war. In this book, David Lonsdale puts that notion to the test.
Using a range of contexts, the book sets out to look at whether the classical Clausewitzian theory of the nature of war will retain its validity in this new age. The analysis covers the character of the future battlespace, the function of command, and the much-hyped concept of Strategic Information Warfare. Finally, the book broadens its perspective to examine the nature of 'Information Power' and its implications for geopolitics. Through an assessment of both historical and contemporary case studies (including the events following September 11 and the recent war in Iraq), the author concludes that although the future will see many changes to the conduct of warfare, the nature of war, as given theoretical form by Clausewitz, will remain essentially unchanged.”
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“Any state at war attempts to steer the conflict to the point where it can demonstrate its relative advantage. Thus underlying each war is a struggle over its particular nature, and in a dynamic process each side attempts to shape a war paradigm that suits its own relative strengths, while the adversary attempts to impose its preferred paradigm on the conflict. Israel, for example, seemingly has an edge in military effectiveness, and has therefore always preferred short, decisive wars. Its enemies, however, have an overall advantage in stamina and ability to leverage the international system. They therefore strive to lengthen the war and bring Israel to the point of defeat through attrition of the Israeli political-civilian system. In this book, Ron Tira examines the different aspects that characterise a war, from the centre of gravity to be attacked to the elements constituting military decision, as they are manifested in 'simple' symmetrical wars; asymmetrical wars versus a state opponent; guerrilla warfare; parallel warfare; and next generation warfare. The author first surveys types of war and the circumstances whereby the classical doctrine of war is progressively less valid, and then devises additional analytical tools necessary to understand these more complex conflicts. The study examines the relevance of classical doctrine and applies these new tools and concepts to a range of historical examples, from the Second Punic War to World War II to some of Israel's main wars. The final case evaluated is the next generation of wars that Israel and other Western countries may find themselves fighting - wars against states that have adopted the guerrilla paradigm. It is published in association with the Institute for National Security Studies, Israel.”
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“This important new book deals with the changing nature of war in the post-Cold War era and the emergence of new forms of warfare in which warlords, mercenaries and terrorists play an increasingly important role.”
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“This is an analysis of American foreign policy and the role of the military, including a warning about the current state of affairs and recommendations for future policies. The book applies political and historical sensibilities to the foreign policy dilemmas and threats facing the United States today. It examines the crises in Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, North Korea, and Rwanda, evaluating US actions in each situation, lays out historical rules for going to war, and discusses how these rules serve or misserve America in the current political environment, suggesting new rules of engagement. Drawing from works on strategic thinking and the author's own knowledge of today's military, the book offers a new vision of the role of the US worldwide. From where and when troops should be sent, to the dangers inherent in peace-keeping missions, to the need to increase military spending, the book establishes a military policy for the new world order.”
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“"The greatest historian that ever lived." Such was Macaulay's assessment of Thucydides (c. 460-400 BC) and his history of the Peloponnesian War, the momentous struggle between Athens and Sparta that lasted for twenty-seven years from 431 to 404 BC, involved virtually the whole of the Greek world, and ended in the fall of Athens. A participant in the war himself, Thucydides brings to his history an awesome intellect, brilliant narrative, and penetrating analysis of the nature of power, as it affects both states and individuals. Of the prose writers of the ancient world, Thucydides has had more lasting influence on western thought than all but Plato and Aristotle. This new edition combines a masterly new translation by Martin Hammond with comprehensive supporting material, including summaries of individual Books; textual notes; a comprehensive analytical index; an appendix on weights, measures and distances, money, and calendars; ten maps; an up-to-date bibliography; and an illuminating introduction by P.J. Rhodes.”
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“The first modern treatise of political philosophy, The Prince remains one of the world’s most influential and widely read books. Machiavelli, whose name has become synonymous with expedient exercises of will, reveals nothing less than the secrets of power: how to gain it, how to wield it, and how to keep it. But curiously, this work of outspoken clarity has, for centuries, inspired myriad interpretations as to its author’s true message. The Introduction by noted Italian Renaissance scholar Albert Russell Ascoli provides a perfect opening to Peter Constantine’s illuminating new translation of this seminal work.”
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“Examines the various factors that impelled leaders on both sides of the conflict in World War II to respond to immediate problems with actions resulting in effects that were often neither planned nor foreseen. Both Great Britain and Germany drifted into an escalation that ended in the wholesale bombardment of cities and civilian populations, when neither had originally planned any such action, and serves as the author’s lesson to show us how decisionmakers can respond once more to provocations and counterreactions. Emotional pressures, the fog of war, and judgments blurred by wishful thinking can produce decisions, even self-destructive decisions, and lead down an inexorable path to all-out, total war. More than thirty years after its initial publication, and to celebrate RAND’s 60th Anniversary, RAND is proud to bring this classic work back into print in paperback and digital ”
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“Review from Publisher's Weekly: As editorial features editor of the Wall Street Journal, Boot (Out of Order: Arrogance, Corruption, and Incompetence on the Bench) has a reputation as a fire-breathing polemicist and unabashed imperialist. This book addresses America's "small wars" in chronological order, dividing the action from 1801 to the present into three sections ("Commercial Power," "Great Power" and "Superpower") to argue that "small war missions are militarily doable" and are now in fact a necessity. Beginning with a description of going to work on September 11 as the World Trade Center tragedy displaced the WSJ newsroom, Boot quickly gets down to some historical detail: from the U.S. expedition against the Barbary pirates to violent squabbles in Panama, Samoa, the Philippines, China, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Mexico, Beirut, Grenada, Somalia and Bosnia. Examples of wars "that were fought less than `wholeheartedly,' " of wars "without exit strategies" and wars "in which U.S. soldiers act as `social workers' " are decried. Each of the 15 short chapters might have been the focus of a separate in-depth book, so Boot's take is once over very lightly indeed. While America's and the world's small wars certainly seem more and more related, Boot's historical descriptions are too thin to provide a solid foundation for relating one war to another”
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“Review from Parameters: U.S. Army War College Quarterly, Autumn 2005
This is a stimulating – nay, provocative – book that should cause military readers and all associated with the security of the United States to question their fundamental assumptions. It is also a gutsy book because the author, a serving officer, asserts in effect that the Secretary of Defense, his team in the Pentagon, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are wrong in the way they are fighting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. He further contends that the United States stands a good chance of losing its wars in the future unless the forces confront the realities of warfare in this century.”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
Policy & Politics
Book
“The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice is an original contribution to the general theory of strategy. While heavily indebted to Carl von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and the very few other classic authors, this book presents the theory, rather than merely comments on the theory as developed by others. The author explains that the purpose of strategy is to connect purposefully politics and policy with the instruments they must use. The primary focus of attention is on military strategy, but this focus is well nested in discussion of grand strategy, for which military strategy is only one strand. The book presents the general theory of strategy comprehensively and explains the utility of this general theory for the particular strategies that strategists need to develop in order to meet their historically unique challenges. The book argues that strategy's general theory provides essential education for practicing strategists at all times and in all circumstances. As general theory, The Strategy Bridge is as relevant to understanding strategic behaviour in the Peloponnesian War as it is for the conflicts of the twenty-first century. The book proceeds from exposition of general strategic theory, to address three basic issue areas that are not at all well explained, let alone understood with a view to advancing better practice, in the extant literature. Specifically, the book tackles the problems that harass and imperil strategic performance; it probes deeply into the hugely underexamined subject of just what it is that the strategist produces-strategic effect; and it 'joins up the dots' from theory through practice to consequences by means of a close examination of command performance. The author takes a holistic view of strategy, and it is rigorously attentive to the significance of the contexts within which and for which strategies are developed and applied. The book regards the strategist as a hero, charged with the feasible, but awesomely difficult, task of converting the threat and use of force (for military strategy) into desired political consequences. He seeks some control over the rival or enemy via strategic effect, the instrumental produce of his instrumental labours. In order to maximise his prospects for success, the practicing strategist requires all the educational assistance that strategic theory can provide.”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
Policy & Politics
Book
“The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice is an original contribution to the general theory of strategy. While heavily indebted to Carl von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and the very few other classic authors, this book presents the theory, rather than merely comments on the theory as developed by others. The author explains that the purpose of strategy is to connect purposefully politics and policy with the instruments they must use. The primary focus of attention is on military strategy, but this focus is well nested in discussion of grand strategy, for which military strategy is only one strand. The book presents the general theory of strategy comprehensively and explains the utility of this general theory for the particular strategies that strategists need to develop in order to meet their historically unique challenges. The book argues that strategy's general theory provides essential education for practicing strategists at all times and in all circumstances. As general theory, The Strategy Bridge is as relevant to understanding strategic behaviour in the Peloponnesian War as it is for the conflicts of the twenty-first century. The book proceeds from exposition of general strategic theory, to address three basic issue areas that are not at all well explained, let alone understood with a view to advancing better practice, in the extant literature. Specifically, the book tackles the problems that harass and imperil strategic performance; it probes deeply into the hugely underexamined subject of just what it is that the strategist produces-strategic effect; and it 'joins up the dots' from theory through practice to consequences by means of a close examination of command performance. The author takes a holistic view of strategy, and it is rigorously attentive to the significance of the contexts within which and for which strategies are developed and applied. The book regards the strategist as a hero, charged with the feasible, but awesomely difficult, task of converting the threat and use of force (for military strategy) into desired political consequences. He seeks some control over the rival or enemy via strategic effect, the instrumental produce of his instrumental labours. In order to maximise his prospects for success, the practicing strategist requires all the educational assistance that strategic theory can provide.”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
Policy & Politics
Book
“The Israeli Defense Force has long been one of the world's most admired--and most mythologized--fighting forces. But is it--was it ever--everything it's cracked up to be? Have its remarkable, against all odds, victories been a double-edged sword for Israel? Combining razor-sharp analysis with dramatic narrative, vivid portraits of soldiers and commanders with illuminating discussions of battle tactics and covert actions, The Sword and the Olive traces the history of the IDF from its beginnings in Palestine to today. The book also goes beyond chronology to wrestle with the political and ethical struggles that have shaped the IDF and the country it serves--struggles that are manifesting themselves in the recent tragic escalation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Often revisionist in attitude, surprising in many of its conclusions, this book casts new light on the struggle for peace in the Middle East.”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
Policy & Politics
Book
“Review by Publishers Weekly: Most wars since 1945 have been low-intensity conflicts and, according to the author, incomparably more significant than conventional wars in terms of casualties suffered and political results achieved. Citing the dismal record of regular forces vs. irregulars in Vietnam, Lebanon, Afghanistan and elsewhere, he suggests that as small-scale wars proliferate, conventional armed forces will shrink and the burden of protecting society will shift to the booming security business. Van Creveld, who teaches history at Hebrew University in Jerusalem, argues that the theories of Karl von Clausewitz, which form the basis for Western strategic thought, are largely irrelevant to nonpolitical wars such as the Islamic jihad and wars for existence such as Israel's Six-Day War. In the future, he prophesies, wars will be waged by groups of terrorists, guerrillas and bandits motivated by fanatical, ideologically-based loyalties; conventional battles will be replaced by skirmishes, bombings and massacres. Weapons will become less, rather than more, sophisticated and the high-tech weapons industry (which "supports itself by exporting its own uselessness") will collapse like a house of cards. A bold, provocative, frightening book.
Copyright 1991 Reed Business Information, Inc.”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
Policy & Politics
Book
“When the U.S. military invaded Iraq, it lacked a common understanding of the problems inherent in counterinsurgency campaigns. It had neither studied them, nor developed doctrine and tactics to deal with them. It is fair to say that in 2003, most Army officers knew more about the U.S. Civil War than they did about counterinsurgency.
The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual was written to fill that void. The result of unprecedented collaboration among top U.S. military experts, scholars, and practitioners in the field, the manual espouses an approach to combat that emphasizes constant adaptation and learning, the importance of decentralized decision-making, the need to understand local politics and customs, and the key role of intelligence in winning the support of the population. The manual also emphasizes the paradoxical and often counterintuitive nature of counterinsurgency operations: sometimes the more you protect your forces, the less secure you are; sometimes the more force you use, the less effective it is; sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction. ”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
Policy & Politics
Book
“From a highly decorated general, a brilliant new way of understanding war and its role in the twenty-first century.
Drawing on his vast experience as a commander during the first Gulf War, and in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Northern Ireland, General Rupert Smith gives us a probing analysis of modern war. He demonstrates why today’s conflicts must be understood as intertwined political and military events, and makes clear why the current model of total war has failed in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other recent campaigns. Smith offers a compelling contemporary vision for how to secure our world and the consequences of ignoring the new, shifting face of war.”
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Policy & Politics
Book
“The seminal text on neorealist analysis! From Theory of International Politics: National politics is the realm of authority, of administration, and of law. International politics is the realm of power, of struggle, and of accommodation. . . . States, like people, are insecure in proportion to the extent of their freedom. If freedom is wanted, insecurity must be accepted. Organizations that establish relations of authority and control may increase security as they decrease freedom. If might does not make right, whether among people or states, then some institution or agency has intervened to lift them out of nature s realm. The more influential the agency, the stronger the desire to control it becomes. In contrast, units in an anarchic order act for their own sakes and not for the sake of preserving an organization and furthering their fortunes within it. Force is used for one s own interest. In the absence of organization, people or states are free to leave one another alone. Even when they do not do so, they are better able, in the absence of the politics of the organization, to concentrate on the politics of the problem and to aim for a minimum agreement that will permit their separate existence rather than a maximum agreement for the sake of maintaining unity. If might decides, then bloody struggles over right can more easily be avoided.”
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Strategy & Strategic History
Book
“This edition of the U. S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy continues to reflect the structure and approach of the core national security strategy and policy curriculum at the War College. The fourth edition is published in two volumes that correspond roughly to the Department of National Security and Strategy’s core courses: “Theory of War and Strategy” and “National Security Policy and Strategy.” Like previous editions, this one is largely an expansion of its predecessor rather than a major rewriting. About a quarter of the chapters are new, and several others have undergone significant rewrites or updates. However, approximately half of the book remains unchanged. Although this is not primarily a textbook, it does reflect both the method and manner we use to teach strategy formulation to America’s future senior leaders. The book is not a comprehensive or exhaustive treatment of either strategic theory or the policymaking process. Both volumes are organized to proceed from the general to the specific. Thus the first volume opens with general thoughts on the nature and theory of war and strategy, proceeds to look at the complex aspect of power, and concludes with specific theoretical issues. Similarly, the second volume begins by examining the policy/strategy process, moves to a look at the strategic environment, and concludes with some specific issues. This edition adds several short case studies that can be used to illustrate the primary material in the volume.”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
Policy & Politics
Book
“This edition of the U. S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy continues to reflect the structure and approach of the core national security strategy and policy curriculum at the War College. The fourth edition is published in two volumes that correspond roughly to the Department of National Security and Strategy’s core courses: “Theory of War and Strategy” and “National Security Policy and Strategy.” Like previous editions, this one is largely an expansion of its predecessor rather than a major rewriting. About a quarter of the chapters are new, and several others have undergone significant rewrites or updates. However, approximately half of the book remains unchanged. Although this is not primarily a textbook, it does reflect both the method and manner we use to teach strategy formulation to America’s future senior leaders. The book is not a comprehensive or exhaustive treatment of either strategic theory or the policymaking process. Both volumes are organized to proceed from the general to the specific. Thus the first volume opens with general thoughts on the nature and theory of war and strategy, proceeds to look at the complex aspect of power, and concludes with specific theoretical issues. Similarly, the second volume begins by examining the policy/strategy process, moves to a look at the strategic environment, and concludes with some specific issues. This edition adds several short case studies that can be used to illustrate the primary material in the volume”
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Understanding Modern Warfare by David Jordan (Author), James D. Kiras (Author), David J. Lonsdale (Author), Ian Speller (Author), Christopher Tuck (Author), C. Dale Walton (Author)
War & Warfare
Book
“A major new study of the theory and practice of warfare in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Using relevant examples from recent history, this book provides a complete introduction to the issues, ideas, concepts, context and vocabulary of modern warfare. The expert team of authors explore the conduct of war across land, sea, air and space in addition to addressing key issues relating to contemporary strategy, weapons of mass destruction and irregular warfare, including insurgency, terrorism and civil war. They provide an incisive and structured grounding in military theory and argue for the importance of understanding warfare within the joint (inter-service) context and as an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary phenomenon. By providing the tools required to truly understand contemporary military doctrine this accessible survey will be an invaluable resource for any student of military history or international relations as well as for military professionals.”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
Book
“These essays provide an authoritative introduction to Carl von Clausewitz and enlarge the history of war by joining it to the history of ideas and institutions and linking it with intellectual biography.”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
Policy & Politics
Book
“Would you like to add a review? Email us at info@infinityjournal.com ”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
Policy & Politics
Book
“A major statement on the relations between military affairs and statecraft by the dean of American civilian strategists. A thought-provoking and original look at WHY humans fight. The author puts war in its international political context as he examines the history of wars Ñ World Wars I and II, Korea, and Vietnam and looks at the changing attitudes toward war, theories on its causes, "vital interests," nuclear weapons, and the true nature of strategy. Trade .”
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War & Warfare
Book
“Review from Publishers Weekly: From bronze cannons to smart bombs, this engaging study examines the impact of new weaponry on war by spotlighting exemplary battles, including famous epics like the defeat of the Spanish Armada and the attack on Pearl Harbor along with obscure clashes like the 1898 Battle of Omdurman, in which a British colonial force mowed down Sudanese tribesmen with machine guns. Boot (The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power) gives due weight to social context: advanced weapons don't spell victory unless accompanied by good training and leadership; innovative doctrine; an efficient, well-funded bureaucracy; and a "battle culture of forbearance" that eschews warrior ferocity in favor of a soldierly ethos of disciplined stoicism under fire. These factors flourish, he contends, under a rationalist, progressive Western mindset. The author, a journalist and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, enlivens his war stories with profiles of generals from Gustavus Adolphus to Norman Schwarzkopf and splashes of blood and guts. Boot distills 500 years of military history into a well-paced, insightful narrative.
(Oct.)
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. ”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
Book
“The United States Marine Corps is the largest such force on the planet, and yet it is the smallest, most elite section of the U.S. military, one with a long and storied history. Here, in the most current version of the manual used by the Corps itself, is an explanation of the philosophy that makes the Marine Corps unique-here are the concepts and values behind how the Corps fights. Topics discussed include: war defined. the science, art, and dynamic of war, war as an act of policy, styles of warfare, professional military education, the philosophy of command, and more. Military buffs, war-gamers, and anyone seeking to understand the increasingly complicated global stage will find this a fascinating and informative document.”
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War & Warfare
Book
“This brilliant account covers a millennium of Greek warfare. With specially commissioned battle maps and vivid illustrations, Victor Davis Hanson takes the reader into the heart of Greek warfare, classical beliefs, and heroic battles. This colorful portrait of ancient Greek culture explains why their approach to fighting was so ruthless and so successful.
- Development of the Greek city-state and the rivalries of Athens and Sparta.
- Rise of Alexander the Great and the Hellenization of the Western world.
- Famous thinkers—Sophocles, Socrates, Demosthenes—who each faced his opponent in battle, armed with spear and shield.
- Unsurpassed military theories that still influence the structure of armies and the military today.”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
Article
“Regrettably, the American Army’s new way of war, otherwise called population-centric counterinsurgency, has become the only operational tool in the Army’s repertoire to deal with problems of insurgency and instability throughout the world. Population-centric COIN may be a reasonable opera- tional method to use in certain circumstances, but it is not a strategy. There are flaws and limitations that need to be exposed and considered.”
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Strategy & Strategic History
Policy & Politics
Article
“Excerpt from article: For General David Petraeus, the summer of 2010 must evoke eerie and unwelcome parallels to the summer of 2007. Once again he is presiding over a “surge” in a war that is increasingly seen back home as a lost cause. Once again the troops under his command are expending blood, sweat, and intellect to salvage a decent outcome on the ground while legions of critics offer “Plan B's” that will supposedly safeguard our vital interests at a much lower cost”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
Article
“In this article, T.X. looks at Afghan strategy and the inherent problems that plague the U.S. and Afghanistan. ”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
Article
“This monograph argues that the idea of an operational level of war charged with the planning and conduct of campaigns misconceives the relationship between wars, campaigns, and operations, and is both historically mistaken and wrong in theory. Brigadier Justin Kelly (Australian Army Retired) and Dr. Michael Brennan conclude that its incorporation into U.S.
doctrine has had the regrettable impact of separating the conduct of campaigns from the conduct of wars and consequently marginalized the role of politics in the direction of war. In essence, they argue that the idea of the campaign has come to overwhelm that of strategy.”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
Policy & Politics
Article
“Excerpt: Early in August 1831 Clausewitz wrote to his wife that a letter by him refuting claims that Prussia, in violation of her announced policy of nonintervention, was aiding Russian forces against the Polish insurgents, had appeared in several newspapers.' The literature on Clausewitz has ignored this hint, and yet the letter-the last of his writings to be published while he was alive-is worthr esurrectingA. t the time, it gave the German public a glimpse of Clausewitz'sid eas on politicala ffairs,w hich
apart from this brief emergence were to remain buried in manuscript for another fifty years; to the later reader it suggests a change in emphasis of much of the political energy generated by the Prussian reform movement,w hich was to prove increasingly significant in the course of the century.”
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Intelligence
Article
“This digital document is an article from Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, published by U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School on October 1, 2008. The length of the article is 6791 words. The page length shown above is based on a typical 300-word page. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
Article
“Excerpt from introduction: There is nowhere in the world, I am quite certain, where a highly
trained group of academics and a constantly shifting cast of field-grade military officers give such sustained attention to On War as in the Strategy and Policy Department of the US Naval War College, and I
have belonged to that department for 18 years. I arrived simultaneously with Michael Handel, who certainly rivaled Peter Paret and Sir Michael Howard as one of the outstanding Clausewitz scholars in the Western world, and whose presence had a most stimulating effect on all his colleagues. After his untimely death in June 2001 (which among other things deprived us of his insights in the new era of warfare that was about to burst upon us), I became the Clausewitz lecturer in the department, forcing me to systemize my own ideas. My colleagues and I have also benefited, as I can see more clearly after reviewing these works, from our continual use of Clausewitz’s ideas to analyze the widest possible variety of wars, from the fifth century BCE Peloponnesian War all the way through today’s war on terror.
Source: Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 32, Issue 4 August 2009 , pages 667 - 685”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
Article
“Excerpt from article: 'To understand centers of gravity, one must be grounded in the original context of On War. Book one defines warfare as 'an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will', which entails a 'collision of two living forces.'”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
Article
“To assess Clausewitz's impact on strategy, is to establish the relevance of Clausewitzian thinking to strategic thought and policy. Relevance defines impact, for only that which is relevant endures as a legacy, and a legacy expresses an impact.
Based upon the strategy-impact framework outlined, this essay will first give an overview of Clausewitz's theory of war and then evaluate its impact on strategy.
Source: Journal of Singapore Armed Forces, V25 N1, Jan/Mar 1999
”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
Policy & Politics
Article
“The work of Carl von Clausewitz continues to provoke heated debate. For some scholars, Clausewitz’s On War remains indispensable to serious thought on the resort to war in the modern period. Others, however, see Clausewitz’s work as either outdated, or a morally repellent argument for unlimited, unrestrained and brutal warfare. This essay argues not only that Clausewitz’s work continues to be relevant to discussions on the use of armed force, but also that On War provides a framework for ethical reflection on war and its conduct. Two main preoccupations of western military academies and staff colleges Clausewitz on the one hand, and
the just war tradition on the other can complement, rather than rival each other. On War creates a space for reflection on the use of armed force, and for that reason if no other, should still be considered an important resource for contemporary students and practitioners of strategy.”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
Article
“Many people view Martin van Creveld's views on the
nature of warfare in the twentieth century to be radical and even heretical. Yet on close examination, his model on the nature of warfare provides a useful framework for the evaluation of non-conventional warfare.
”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
Article
“Excerpt from article: 'Over the last two decades, the U.S. military has struggled to understand the center of gravity concept as developed by Carl von Clausewitz and to find practical ways to apply it. In the process, however, each of the services—shaped
as they are by different roles, histories, and traditions—has brought individual perspectives to Clausewitz’s expression and redefined it in its respective image.'”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
Article
“At the time of the 9/11 attacks, Washington was embarking on a defense transformation emphasizing missile defense, space assets, precision weaponry, and information technology. This transformation proved irrelevant to the national security threats we now face, with the emergence of nontradi- tional adversaries pursuing ‘‘complex irregular warfare.’’ U.S. forces will have to assume a much more expeditionary character to successfully deal with Islamists’ complex irregular warfare. The March 2005 U.S. National Defense Strategy provides a balance to the longstanding American military emphasis on major-theater war, but it remains to be seen whether the military’s new interest in operations other than conventional, major-combat operations will last or if it will diminish as soon as a new peer competitor rises, allowing the Pentagon to return to its more familiar paradigm”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
Policy & Politics
Article
“Excerpt: While at present there is general agreement on how to carry out counterinsurgency, a clear analysis of the tradeoffs that all counterinsurgents have to deal with is still lacking. While challenges within the field remain, counterinsurgency still faces numerous challenges in theory. Neither scholars nor
practitioners have developed a theoretical framework that has been able to explicitly specify the existing tradeoffs among the three typical goals involved in this doctrine.”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
Article
“Luttwak writes on the fact that there are "alternative methods and tactics of counterinsurgency warfare" but he questions if they really work. He argues that 'Insurgents do not always win, but their defeats can rarely be attributed to counterinsurgency warfare.'”
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War & Warfare
Article
“One of the tactics Israel has used in responding to terrorism has been to seek out and kill individual enemies. Now Washington has started doing the same. The United States and Israel face different circumstances, however, and so the Bush administration should think twice before proceeding.
Source: Foreign Affairs, March/April 2006”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
Article
“The authors review the U.S. Army’s field manual on
counterinsurgency, consider the doctrine and tactics
that it espouses, and survey its current critics. They
present specific examples of its application and conclude that while counterinsurgency does achieve results, the U.S. government lacks a strategic doctrinal framework for implementing counterinsurgency elsewhere. This shortcoming urgently needs to be addressed in a meaningful way by political leaders.
Article source: Public Administration Review – May/June 2010
”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
Policy & Politics
Article
“Excerpt from article: 'Yet today, even within the small community of writers exploring 4GW, there remains a range of opinions on how to define the concept and what its implications are. This is a healthy process and essential to the development of a sound concept because 4GW, like all previous forms of war, continues to evolve even as discussions continue. That brings me to the purpose of this article: to widen the discussion on what forms 4GW may take and to offer a possible model for the next generation of war: 5GW.'”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
Article
“Hughes analyzes General Allenby, the EEF and the Palestine Campaign from 1917-1918”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
Policy & Politics
Article
“Since the establishment of the United Nations, great powers have rarely let small wars burn themselves out. Bosnia and Kosovo are the latest examples of this meddling. Conflicts are interrupted by a steady stream of cease-fires and armistices that only postpone war-induced exhaustion and let belligerents rearm and regroup. Even worse are U.N. refugee-relief operations and NGOs, which keep resentful populations festering in camps and sometimes supply both sides in armed conflicts. This well-intentioned interference only intensifies and prolongs struggles in the long run. The unpleasant truth is that war does have one useful function: it brings peace. Let it.”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
Policy & Politics
Article
“In one of Luttwak's more recent pieces, he provocatively comments on the use of 'Aerial Bombing' and on why 'terror from the skies still works.
”
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War & Warfare
Policy & Politics
Article
“This article examines the literature on ‘new wars’ as it evolved in Germany, Great Britain and the USA. In order to gain an overview of this heterogeneous field of research five hypotheses are derived concerning characteristics of ‘new wars’: (1) the erosion of the state’s monopoly on the use of force; (2) the political economy of ‘new wars’; (3) ‘new wars’ as asymmetric wars; (4) ‘new wars’ as identity-based wars; and (5) terrorism within the framework of ‘new wars’. The concluding section addresses critiques, provides a brief summary and proposes future research.
Source: European Journal of International Relations 2010; 16, 2, pp. 297–309 ”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
Article
“Excerpt from article: 'The British Army has struggled with ongoing campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan because, for reasons largely having to do with insufficient resources, it has not applied its own principles of counterinsurgency. Moreover the army today is a different force than the one that endured and ultimately ‘‘waited-out’’ the troubles in Northern Ireland; it is a much leaner ‘‘high-tech’’ force in structure, equipment and outlook. This makes it a formidable generator of combat power but compromises it in counterinsurgency.'”
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War & Warfare
Policy & Politics
Article
“Since the beginning of the second intifada in the fall of 2000, Israel has pursued a policy in which alleged Palestinian terrorists have been hunted down and killed by government order. The policy is not one of assassination and is consistent with international law because Israel is engaged in armed conflict with terrorists, those targeted are usually killed by conventional military means, not through deception, and the targets of the attacks are not civilians but combatants or are part of a military chain of command. Targeted killing has also been affirmed by Israel’s High Court.
Although targeted killing has been pursued by Israel throughout its history, the scale of the present effort and the use of sophisticated military assets such as helicopter gunships and jet fighters set it apart from earlier practices. The effectiveness of the policy is called into doubt because it has not prevented––and may have contributed to––record numbers of Israeli civilians being killed. The policy has also resulted in informers being revealed, intelligence resources diverted, potential negotiating partners eliminated. It has also produced murderous retaliation and international condemnation of Israel. Benefits of the policy include impeding the effectiveness of terrorist operations, keeping terrorists on the run, and deterring some attacks. In addition, it affords the Israeli public a sense of revenge and retribution.
Because it targets the actual perpetrators of terrorism, targeted killing provides a proportionate and discriminate response to the threat Israel faces. Improving the policy will require better civilian oversight, greater care to eliminate harm to innocent bystanders, and refraining from killing political leaders. Despite its many shortcomings, Israel is justified in pursuing this policy so long as it faces a terrorist threat that the Palestinian Authority will not or cannot control.”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
Article
“Excerpt from Bassford's article, which was first published in War and History, Volume 1, No. 3 (1994): "Now, along comes John Keegan (1934- ), British historian cum journalist, to turn back the clock. Keegan's Clausewitz, heavily discussed in the author's widely reviewed A History of Warfare (1993), is a narrow-minded regimental officer who typifies the Frederician tradition of Cadavergehorsam, unthinking obedience to savage discipline. He is the brutal philosopher of pitiless, aggressive, total war; an "unpromoted" and "unhonoured"* but self-seeking sucker-up to authority (and simultaneously a traitorous dog who willfully disobeyed his rightful monarch) whose career was blighted by his own extremism; a saber-rattling Prussian militarist who worshipped Napoleon and understood warfare only through the Napoleonic lens; the intellectual cause of the pan-European disaster of World War I;*10 and a theorist whose ideas are obsolete, irrelevant, and actively dangerous. Clausewitz even seems to have done in the poor Easter Islanders and inspired Shaka Zulu and the Mongols."”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
Policy & Politics
Article
“'At least three important military theorists emerged from the experience of the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon: The Austrian Archduke Charles; the Swiss writer Antoine-Henri Jomini; and the Prussian Carl von Clausewitz. The archduke has had very little influence in the United States or Great Britain, since his work was never translated into English.* The military-theoretical traditions founded by Jomini and Clausewitz, however, have very definitely had an impact on our military thinking.'”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
Article
“This article examines the limitations of traditional strategic approaches to the resolution of contemporary conflicts. It proposes control as the unifying idea for military action.”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
Article
“Excerpt from McMaster's article: During the decade prior to the terrorist attacks against the United States in September 2001, thinking about defence was driven by a fantastical theory
about the character of future war rather than by clear visions of emerging threats to national security in the context of history and contemporary conflict. Proponents of what became known as military transformation argued for a ‘capabilities based’ method of thinking about future war. In practice, however, capabilities-based analysis focused narrowly on how the United States would like to fight and then assumed that the preference was relevant.
Source: Survival, 50: 1, pp. 19-30 ”
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War & Warfare
Policy & Politics
Article
“In this analysis, the author identifies some of the contining obstacles to achieving civil-military integration in war. She argues that there are continuing disagreements about who should lead the shaping of the political landscape in war, and that while doctrine has advanced in this area, good doctrine does not guarantee the effective execution of governance-related tasks. Sound operational approaches are required as well.”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
Policy & Politics
Article
“Excerpt from article: The problem appears in Jablonsky's discussion of "what Clausewitz had referred to as the `remarkable trinity': the military, the government, and the people." There is a serious discrepancy between this definition of the "remarkable trinity" and the definition given by Clausewitz himself in On War: Clausewitz defines the components of the trinity as (1) primordial violence, hatred, and enmity; (2) the play of chance and probability; and (3) war's element of subordination to rational policy. By no means originating with Jablonsky, this discrepancy appears frequently in recent analyses, both those that enlist Clausewitz's support and those which attack the Prussian philosopher of war as benighted, evil, or simply irrelevant. In fact, the "remarkable" or "paradoxical" trinity is one of the Clausewitzian concepts most frequently cited in all of recent military literature. Since interpretations of Clausewitz are a source of such extensive controversy, it seems important to differentiate between what Clausewitz actually said and other concepts of a trinity that are derived from--but not the same as the "remarkable trinity" defined in On War.”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
Article
“Contradicting centuries of Western practice, the problem of future wars is one of learning to fight wars amongst the people. Currently, Western armies are optimized for fighting the wars of a previous age. This has begun to change. The United States Army particularly has moved very rapidly from being a force that fundamentally abjured irregular warfare and nation-building to one which is beginning to embrace them as core activities. Still, organizational, structural, and cultural change is slow and uneven. Moreover, argues this paper, a major failing is that the current orthodoxy suggests that the future force ought to be either medium-weight or bifurcated between light and heavy units. Both approaches are mistaken: the first will lead to a force disadvantaged in both regular and irregular warfare; the second reinforces an erroneous conception that war-fighting and nation-building are distinct and separate endeavours. Instead, the challenges of contemporary use of force require a fundamental reorientation of thinking, organizing, and equipping regular land forces to reflect the increasingly apprehended fact that regular warfare is growing more and more irregular.”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
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“All would-be strategists would benefit by some formal education. However, for education in strategy to be well-directed, it needs to rest upon sound assumptions concerning the eternal nature yet ever shifting character, meaning, and function of strategy, as well as the range of behaviors required for effective strategic performance. The author emphasizes the necessity for strategic education to help develop the strategic approach, the way of thinking that can solve or illuminate strategic problems. He advises that such education should not strive for a spurious relevance by presenting a military variant of current affairs. The author believes that the strategist will perform better in today's world if he has mastered and can employ strategy’s general theory.”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
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“Despite its own extensive experience in nontraditional wars, the United States has rarely excelled at this portion of the conflict spectrum in the past half century. Its current conventional military superiority will ensure that it gets much more experience in today's Small Wars Century, an era that began in the 1950s with the rise of revolutionary warfare. For several decades, thanks in large part due to lingering myths from the Vietnam war, this area has been a conceptual and intellectual orphan in US professional military institutions. Without understanding the past, and how new conditions impact the relevance of this experience as a guide, US military planners and policy makers will be unable to translate America's intentions into effective campaigns. Without a sound grasp of history and the characteristics of nontraditional war as part of the overall social phenomena of war, the US will continue to find its overwhelming military dominance irrelevant to its most pressing security interests”
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Strategy & Strategic History
Policy & Politics
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“Excerpt from article: Economic crisis, mounting national debt, excessive foreign commitments -- this is no way to run an empire. America needs serious strategic counseling. And fast. It has never been Rome, and to adopt its strategies no -- its ruthless expansion of empire, domination of foreign peoples, and bone-crushing brand of total war -- would only hasten America's decline. Better instead to look to the empire's eastern incarnation: Byzantium, which outlasted its Roman predecessor by eight centuries. It is the lessons of Byzantine grand strategy that America must rediscover today”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
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“This article focuses on much discussed questions of targeted killings. Are they matters of policy, strategy, or tactics? How is their effectiveness to be gauged, in light of contingencies of time, place, and jurisdiction? Why are there such divergent views of this conceptually straightforward activity? Is any international con- sensus on targeted killing either possible or necessary? ”
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War & Warfare
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“Excerpt from article: New warfare poses extraordinary dilemmas for the application of two key humanitarian law principles: the principle of distinction and the principle of proportionality. The principle of distinction requires soldiers to differentiate between people they can target and people they are obligated to protect from harm. The principle of proportionality requires soldiers to not attack a target if the expected innocent casualties are excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage gained. Applying these two principles in new warfare brings us to the fundamental question: who can be lawfully targeted, when, and how often?”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
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“Many now see future warfare as a matter of nonstate actors employing irregular methods against Western states. This expectation has given rise to a range of sweeping proposals for transforming the U.S. military to meet such threats. In this context, Hezbollah’s 2006 campaign in southern Lebanon has been receiving increasing attention as a prominent recent example of a nonstate actor fighting a Westernized state. In particular, critics of irregular-warfare transformation often cite the 2006 case as evidence that non-state actors can nevertheless wage conventional warfare in state-like ways. This monograph assesses this claim via a detailed analysis of Hezbollah’s military behavior, coupled with deductive inference from observable Hezbollah behavior in the field to findings for their larger strategic intent for the campaign.”
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War & Warfare
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“"The American way of war" refers to the grinding strategy of attrition that U.S. generals traditionally employed to prevail in combat. But that was then. Spurred by dramatic advances in information technology, the new American way of war relies on speed, maneuver, flexibility, and surprise. This approach was put on display in the invasion of Iraq and should reshape what the military looks like.
Source: Foreign Affairs July/August 2003”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
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“Another in a series of studies concerned with the general theory of air strategy in a nuclear age. The present study deals with some of the peculiar and historically novel requirements of a deterrence posture. The argument presented is that modern deterrence is like traditional deterrence in some respects, but differs in that today deterrence of total war is considered a policy that must go permanently unchallenged. A deterrence strategy diverges significantly from a strategy which emphasizes ability to win if war comes. (Also published as P-1405.)”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
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“Excerpt from article: 'My purpose here is to re-introduce a new Clausewitzian concept which was first published on the DNI website in May 2008 as my Clausewitz on Cohesion. This paper was the second part of a two-part critique of current trends in strategic theory and what I see as negative influences since 1991.'”
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Strategy & Strategic History
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“Counterterrorism efforts over the past five years have yielded important progress against Al-Qaeda abroad, even with heightened anxiety about the threat of attacks at home. There was certainly no `clash of civilizations'; violent Salafism engendered a muscular backlash in Muslim-majority countries, which threatened Al-Qaeda's ability to recruit and even survive. At the same time, the policies of major states became more effective and better aligned. A nascent counterterrorism coalition emerged with unprecedented sharing of intelligence, operations and deradicalization techniques (especially bilaterally). In the face of these developments, a defensive Al-Qaeda scrambled to exploit vulnerabilities so as to regain a mental edge. The result was two tactical setbacks for the allies: first, Al-Qaeda and its associates redoubled their efforts to kill civilians on western soil, focusing particularly on radicalized home grown amateurs; and second, they leaned more heavily on reinvigorated affiliates, some of whom tried to project force beyond their local operating areas for the first time. As a result, terrorist operations in the US and UK were more frequent, unpredictable and unsophisticated, but nonetheless potentially lethal. As the period drew to a close, the crucial question was whether the two western allies could maintain their nerve, luck, skill and sufficient equilibrium to both fend off a domestic attack and plan for an effective strategic response in the event that one occurred.”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
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“This article examines, from an Israeli counterterrorism and legal perspective, the evolution of Israeli “targeted killings” (TK) as distinct from past “assassination” and “liquidation” operations. The article traces the evolution using distinct phases. In phase one, the article briefly traces the history of targeted operations, beginning with the Yishuv in the 1920s, working forward to the outbreak of the al-Aqsa armed conflict in 2000. The study then shifts to phase two, the most critical aspect of the story of TKs—the radical changes that occurred as a result of the consequences of the Thabet Thabet Operation in December 2000, showing precisely how, when, and why Israeli furtive “assassinations” morphed into overt TKs. The third phase describes the radical changes and reactions of the Thabet Thabet Operation; of how it marked the end of the quasi-institutionalization of “assassinations” and “liquidations” and began the path to the legalization of a progressively expanded counterterrorism tactic. The study then shifts to the fourth phase, which describes how the creation of an Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) “legal opinion” eventually led to the Israeli High Court of Justice's (HCJ) 2006 verdict on TK. It also covers how the Israeli decision-making process on TK evolved. Finally, phase five analyzes the aftereffects of the HCJ's decision on TK, which is ultimately a consequence of the December 2000 Thabet Thabet operation. Lacking a contemporary historical understanding of this operation and its consequences, the tactic cannot be wholly understood. The purpose of this article is to offer an understanding of how TKs differ from past targeted operations and why they evolved, terminologically, legally, and operationally, specifically as a result of the Thabet Thabet Operation
Source: Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 2 February 2010 , pages 111 - 133 ”
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Strategy & Strategic History
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“Excerpt from article: 'The problem is not Afghanistan, but the entire concept of COIN, and the debate around it is hardly academic. Counterinsurgency has seized the high ground in the Pentagon and the halls of Washington, and there are other places in the world where it is being deployed, from the jungles of Columbia to the dry lands that border the Sahara. If the COIN doctrine is not challenged, people in the United States may well find themselves debating its merits in places like Somalia, Yemen, or Mauritania.'”
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Strategy & Strategic History
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“Excerpt from article: Mastering the languages, cultural nuances, beliefs and taboos that prevail in a theater of war, area of operations or tactical environment is vital to military success. It’s much easier to kill people you understand.
Beyond that, cultural insights ease routine operations and negotiations, the training of local forces and the development of intelligence. Environmental mastery helps us avoid making unnecessary enemies. But that is where the advantages end in conflicts of blood and faith: No amount of cultural sensitivity inculcated in U.S. troops will persuade fanatic believers to discard their religion, nor can any amount of American empathy change a foreign thug’s ethnic identity.”
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Strategy & Strategic History
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“Excerpt from article: Since the early 1990s, military theorists examined ways that a rogue state, substate, or nonstate actor could frustrate a conventional force. The 2006 Israeli clash with Hezbollah came to be seen as the harbinger of an era of cheap missiles, stronger defenses, and danger to conventional forces. Hezbollah’s supposed success furthered a growing notion that a strong high-end asymmetric warfare defense could make a country a poison pill for foreign intervention.
But this narrative does not capture the conflict’s ambivalent results, exaggerating Israeli difficulties while overplaying Hezbollah’s performance. The Hezbollah myth also masks the ability of a sufficiently driven and equipped state to use conventional military power to annihilate a weaker state or substate group. While the operational challenges of high-end asymmetric threats do pose dangers for conventional forces that deserve sustained analysis, the strategic question of whether high-end asymmetric warfare can effectively deter a conventional force hinges instead on the political context of the conflict and the adversaries who fight it.”
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Strategy & Strategic History
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“Excerpt from introduction: "Recent years have witnessed dramatic changes in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and other Western military organizations regarding force structure and force utilization concepts, based on a preference for standoff precision firepower over classic maneuver. However, as long-range fire is unable to achieve directly all types of required military achievements (such as, for example, seizing, combing, and clearing territory), an innovative approach was developed for deciding wars without direct tactical encounters on the battlefield. Instead, the objective is to be attained indirectly, through effects designed to disrupt the enemy’s functioning as a system, thereby bringing it to cognitive- strategic collapse."
Source: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) Memorandum 89, March 2007”
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Strategy & Strategic History
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“The purpose of the current paper is to examine the adoption and
adaptation process of mission command (Auftragstaktik) in the US Army. This concept, developed by the Prussians, denotes a decentralized command approach wherein superiors dictate their intent and allow subordinates to formulate their operational plans independently and change it according to the emerging situation. ”
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Strategy & Strategic History
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“The concept of Manoeuvre Warfare (MW) in its modern form was first advocated in the early 1980s as part of the US military conventional response to perceived Warsaw Pact superiority. It has since become widely accepted as a style of warfare and generic concept of operation. This paper will argue that the community it was intended to serve based its wide acceptance largely on ignorance and a lack of intellectual rigor.
Source: The RUSI Journal, Volume 153, Issue 4 August 2008 , pages 62 - 67 ”
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“With its seemingly progressive and humanistic approach, FM 3-24, and counterinsurgency in general, offer a seductive ideal for the future of American war-fighting. But the veneration of COIN conceals a brutal reality. The history of counter-insurgency in the twentieth century is not a story of warm and fuzzy war, of benevolent soldiers providing essential government services to grateful natives, of armed social work, or of the gentleman soldier’s antidote to the Shermanesque notion of Total War. Instead, counter-insurgency is a repeated tale of coercion and violence directed largely against unarmed civilians. And this defines both those COIN efforts that have been successful—and those that have failed.
Excerpt from Cohen's article. Source: World Policy Journal, Volume 27, Number 1, Spring 2010, pp. 75-86”
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Strategy & Strategic History
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“Excerpt from article: The present paper, part of a larger study on the history of guerrilla warfare, deals with the concepts of the theorists of small war between roughly 1750 and 1900, and their views on the utility and the limitations of partisan warfare. To regard these military thinkers as the precursors of modern guerrilla warfare is claiming both too much and too little. Too much, because only a few of them were concerned with the political implications of guerrilla warfare; too little, because from a 'technical' point of view they anticipated most present-day tactics and to regardt hem as mere forerunnersi s to belittle their part.”
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War & Warfare
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“The subject of this article is a broad technical and operational examination of how almost any country on earth can currently gain a viable level of military power by building on the enduring elements of combined arms warfare. These elements are enduring and appeared in the first twenty years of the twentieth century. It is further suggested that skillfully applied this type of capability may enable its user to confront and possibly defeat NATO type expeditionary forces.”
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Strategy & Strategic History
War & Warfare
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“This paper looks at the virtual dimension of contemporary insurgency and counterinsurgency. It argues that the West is faltering in the 'War of Ideas' with global Jihad for the main reason that the messages that we wish to convey lack narrative coherence. This is a result of the fact that we misapprehend the nature of the virtual operational environment whereas our opponents possess an intuitive grasp of it as a result of which their structure and method of operations are better adapted and more effective than our own. There is no reason, beyond inertia, that this should remain the case.”
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War & Warfare
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“Excerpt from Armed Forces Journal article: War isn’t just transforming — it’s ushering in a whole new language to describe conflict, and this language is used in a way that pays little attention to logic or military history. Thus the forces we used to call guerrillas are now “hybrid threats.” Insurgencies are now “complex” and require “complex and adaptive” solutions. Jungles and cities are now “complex terrain.” Put simply, the discussion about future conflict is being conducted using buzzwords and bumper stickers.”
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“Excerpt from article: Of course, not all of Clausewitz's military thought has remained relevant. His vision of war did not include its economic, air, sea, and space dimensions, for example. But his conception of war, his remarkable trinity, and his grasp of the relationship between Politik and war will remain valid as long as states, drug lords, warrior clans, and terrorist groups have mind to wage it.”
